Abstract-Natural gas and electricity systems are becoming increasingly strongly coupled. Gas-fired units (GFUs) are replacing retired coal plants, and the power systems are more dependent on the flexibilities provided by GFUs. The GFUs' power generation capability relies on the availability of gas resources, which is jointly determined by the capacity of gas suppliers and pipeline networks. However, the gas and electricity markets are operated separately. Consequently, the GFUs are forced to "represent" the entire power system to bid on the gas market: they must make forecasts regarding future gas consumption and bear the risk of improper contracts or being unable to meet generation schedules due to occasional insufficient gas supply. When facing larger shares of renewable energies and more frequent gas network congestions, the current market framework is particularly unreliable and inefficient, as well as economically unfriendly to the investors of the GFU assets. In this paper, we try to develop a framework that can combine the two markets. By properly pricing the scarce resources, e.g., gas transmission capacity, the joint market can help us to allocate the resources more efficiently while satisfying the demands. Moreover, a more forward-looking day-ahead market clearing framework is presented by considering the uncertainty brought by renewable energies. The formulation and algorithm of the proposed joint market model will be presented, as are some case studies.
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Weight of the scenarios. γ Cost of natural gas. γ + , γ − Penalty factor applied to natural gas consumption deviations from day-ahead contracts.
Bus where a unit is located. φ w (·) Bus where a wind farm is located.
θ(·)
Gas consumed by a compressor as a function of power output.
Ψ(n)
Set of gas system nodes that are connected to node n.
Ξ(n)
Set of gas suppliers that are located at node n.
Λ(n)
Set of gas loads that are located at node n.
Ω(n)
Set of gas-fired units that are connected to gas node n.
Φ(n)
Set of gas compressors that take gas from node n.
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Power system node at which a unit is located. Γ Generation shift factor matrix. a com Parameters of the gas consumption function of a compressor. B L , B
GF U
Gas node to gas load and gas-fired unit incidence matrix.
Startup and shutdown costs of a unit.
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Index and set of the gas loads. f (·)
Piece-wised generation cost function of the units. For gas-fire units, f (·) does not include fuel cost. f N G (·) Piece-wised fuel characteristics of the gasfired units.
g, G, G ng
Index of generation units, set of conventional units and set of natural gas units.
H, H −
Maximum and minimum power output of a compressor.
i, I
Index and set of the added gas transmission feasibility cuts. j, J Index and set of natural gas suppliers. k, W Index and set of wind farms. l, L Index and set of natural gas loads. L e , L N G Electricity and natural gas load profiles. m, M Index and set of power system nodes. n, N Index and set of gas system nodes.
Maximum and Minimum output of a unit.
P w
Available wind power. Gas output of a gas supplier. w Gas consumed by a GFU. Δw Total gas consumption deviation to gas contract. x Booked gas transmission capacity by a GFU. y Gas flow in a gas transmission branch.
I. INTRODUCTION
A CCORDING to the Energy Information Administration [1] , the share of gas-fired units (GFUs) in the U.S. electricity supply has increased since 2001, reaching a historically high level of 32.7% in 2015. At the same time, the power sector consumed 35.4% of the annual natural gas supply, compared to 30.7% in 2010 and 22.3% in 2000. The two systems have never been as strongly coupled as they are today, and this trend is continuing. The Paris Protocol is believed to have accelerated the retirement of coal plants. From both the environmental and economic perspectives, GFUs, which have a lower CO 2 emission rate than coal plants, are among the best substitutes.
Moreover, the deepening penetration of wind and solar power has put increasing pressure on the operational flexibility of power systems. In additional to GFUs, flexibility can also be provided by electric storages and hydro units. However, storage systems are still expensive, and hydro reservoirs are not always available. GFUs have comparative advantages in this context. The International Energy Agency has predicted that GFUs will become more attractive as the share of wind increases [2] .
GFUs act as the interface of gas and power systems. The supply, demand and network capacity of one system may have impacts on the other system via GFUs. However, the two systems are largely operated independently at present [3] . Even in the most de-regulated environment, each of the two markets is cleared given the status of the other as boundary conditions [4] , which are actually determined by the GFUs. GFUs sign contracts in the gas market based on their forecast of future production, and they also bid in the electricity market within their generation capacity, which is dependent on the availability of gas resources. The coordination efficiency of the two markets largely relies on the GFUs' performance [5] .
However, GFUs have access to only local information; thus, the optimality of the bids is not guaranteed [6] , [7] . Improper bids by GFUs will not only distort the resource allocation but also reduce the GFUs' own profit. This problem is particularly serious when the gas or power network capacity is scarce and shared by multiple parties [8] . The problem can be resolved by improved coordinated planning of the two systems [9] , [10] . However, a more realistic solution is to modify the current operation framework. Some coordinative dispatch and market clearing approaches have been proposed [11] - [18] . In [11] , [12] , the authors assemble the gas network constraints into the optimal power flow (OPF) models, which results in complex nonlinear programming problems. The problems are solved using an evolutionary algorithm or the primal-dual interior-point method. In [13] , a Benders decomposition approach is applied and the nonlinear gas network constraints are decoupled from the unit commitment (UC) problem. The algorithm shows good efficiency. Similarly, a Lagrangian relaxation method and a fuzzy optimization approach are presented in [14] and [15] . In [16] and [17] , a piecewise linear approximation method is used to transform the gas and power system coordination model into a linear programming problem. The above coordination models provide good basis for developing future market clearing tools. Whereas the above papers only focus on steady-state scheduling, reference [18] analyzes the impacts of gas system dynamics, which should be considered in intra-day scheduling.
In fact, GFUs can learn how to properly bid by trial and error if the status of the systems can be accurately predicted. The need for coordination is not urgent with well-experienced market players. However, the systems' status becomes highly uncertain and a spontaneous efficiency enhancement becomes infeasible with a significant share of intermittent resources. Due to the underlying risks, investors are less incented to invest in GFU assets, which in turn impedes the improvement in system flexibility. Researchers have attempted to include the uncertainty into the above coordination approaches to address this problem. A stochastic-programming-based coordinative scheduling tool is presented in [19] , in which wind power is described by scenarios. The model can also be formulated as interval [20] or robust optimization problems [21] by modeling the uncertainty using intervals or sets. Moreover, reference [22] shows that a strategic bidding strategy of GFUs can also be beneficial within the current market framework.
Following the notion that scarce resources should be properly priced for more efficient allocation, this paper aims at develop-ing a non-deterministic coordinated gas and electricity market (ND-CGEM) model for day-ahead (DA) clearing. The model is scenario-based and inspired by the studies on stochastic electricity market clearing approaches [23] , [24] . Compared with the traditional deterministic market clearing approaches, nondeterministic approaches facilitate a more accurate modeling of the uncertainties in the scheduling process [25] , based on which a more flexible allocation of related resources can be achieved. The non-deterministic approaches directly link the flexible resources to the upcoming uncertainties, thus reducing unnecessary conservativeness and improving economic efficiency.
The top priorities of the ND-CGEM model include that the GFUs should be free from guessing their future production or bearing the risks from the gas supply even in an uncertain environment, and the value of sufficient and timely gas supply for the power systems should also be reflected in the gas market. Moreover, real-time (RT) scheduling of the gas loads is often impossible or rather costly because the loads are typically less flexible in terms of response time. Therefore, the schedule should be made in advance if some gas loads are to be shifted to reserve capacity for potential needs of the power system in a congested gas network. The above components will be reflected in the proposed model. In summary, the contribution of this paper is multi-fold: 1) Electric power generation and gas supply are coordinated in contrast to the current segregated practice. The uncertainty of renewable energies such as wind and solar is included considering of the inherent heterogeneity of gas and electric supply/networks in terms of timescale and contractual arrangements. 2) A coordinated market framework is proposed with effective pricing and market clearing mechanisms for both electricity and natural gas. 3) A new product for coordinating the two systems, i.e., reserved gas supply capacity, is proposed. The pricing of the product is discussed. And, its revenue adequacy is proved. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section II, we describe the concepts, assumptions and framework for the ND-CGEM. In Section III, we present the mathematical formulation and solution of the model. Cases studies are presented in Section IV, followed by the conclusions and discussions in Section V.
II. CONCEPTS, ASSUMPTIONS AND FRAMEWORK
In a de-regulation environment, the DA electricity market is typically cleared by solving a security-constrained unit commitment (SCUC) problem. Constrained system balance is the key feature of the SCUC, and the balance is modeled in terms of instantaneous power rather than energy (in DA market, "instantaneous" typically means "hourly").
In contrast, the upstream natural gas market, is dominated by volume contracts. In other words, the concept of instantaneous balance does not apply. Although long-term contracts are still the most common type of contract, the share of spot and shortterm gas trading has been increasing over the past 20 years [26] . Short-term contracts offer the consumers greater flexibility than the traditional long-term take-or-pay contracts, reducing the cost of resource re-allocation and making the gas market more synchronized to the electricity market.
When gas network congestion is not common or the time criticality of the gas demands is low, the hourly gas balance is indeed not a major concern. Therefore, hourly gas balance is rarely considered in the current market practices. However, according to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the competition between heating and electricity companies for gas has caused congestion in the pipelines, leading to delays and spikes in the price of electricity, particularly in winter [27] . A similar issue was reported by ISO New England [28] . When GFUs account for a significant share of power production, timely gas delivery could be crucial to the power system. In addition, considering the flexibility provided by GFUs are increasing important with the deepening penetration of wind power, the reliable and efficient delivery of gas resources at shorter time scale is much more important than before. Therefore, hourly gas balance and network limits should be considered. Network limits can also be resolved by deploying gas storage facilities [29] . However, those facilities are also costly, which motivates us to develop a framework that helps utilize the limited resources in the most efficient manner.
To provide electricity and other ancillary services, GFUs must compete with other gas loads, mainly heating loads, for the resources (gas suppliers and networks). Traditionally, residential loads are assigned higher priority [30] , whereas industrial users may choose between firm and interruptible contracts (GFUs typically sign interruptible contracts because of their lower rate). The framework is intended to encourage the provision of flexibility by energy-intensive gas consumers. However, the categorization is rough and static, which is inflexible and occasionally leads to inefficiency. In fact, some gas loads, though with a relatively long response time, are actually well adjustable if informed with adequate lead time. Meanwhile, the flexibility provided by GFUs will be crucial when the power system experiences a large wind power fluctuation; therefore, the power system can be a less elastic gas consumer at particular times. However, such situations cannot be properly addressed by the existing market frameworks because there is no suitable channel for communicating such information dynamically and efficiently. GFUs are definitely not ideal channels because they do not have access to adequate information and the risks of participating in sequentially cleared gas and electricity markets provide false information and cannot encourage them to act as active coordinators.
Instead of allocating resources following a pre-defined priority list, it could be more efficient to price and allocate them dynamically based on the supply and demand. However, a more sophisticated gas market is not sufficient because GFUs do not reflect all market dynamics; instead, they only represent a portion of the generation portfolio. It is also strongly recommended by PJM that operational information be shared between the two systems [31] .
All of the above problems naturally lead to the development of a joint electricity-gas market framework. In such a framework, (1) gas system resources are allocated considering the condition of the connected power system; (2) the GFUs no longer need to bid in both separate markets and are exposed to far fewer risks; and (3) all of the costs incurred in scheduling gas system resources for the power system are modeled explicitly and do not have to be borne by the GFUs first and then transferred to the end users. In addition, because the need for more reliable gas supply, which backs up GFUs' flexibility, is aroused by the increasing amount of uncertainty of wind power. It is natural to introduce the uncertainty representations into the market clearing tool. In the proposed ND-CGEM model, the uncertainty is described by stochastic scenarios.
However, it should be noted the time scope and the technical representation of the electricity and gas systems are intrinsically different. While focusing on improving the efficiency of resource allocation, we need to carefully examine how the resource is related to the physical characteristics of both systems. In addition, as a market tool, a model should be transparent and not too complicated. The above ideas will be reflected in the development of the model.
Before presenting the formulations, we list some basic assumptions.
Assumption 1: The gas loads other than GFUs are categorized into two groups: high-priority gas loads (i.e., residential loads and firm industrial loads) and low-priority gas loads (i.e., interruptible industrial loads). The priority is modeled based on elasticity. Whereas low-priority loads can be curtailed with a moderate amount of compensation, high-priority loads are nearly inelastic.
Assumption 2: There is no RT natural gas market. Gas load schedules and network capacity reservation should be made at the DA stage. Moreover, the GFUs can have access to only the gas supply within the reserved capacity.
Assumption 3: Similar to the take-or-pay contract, there is a penalty for deviating from the DA gas contracts.
Assumption 4: Only the uncertainty of wind power is modeled in this paper. Although uncertainties from other sources can also been described jointly by the scenarios, we suggest that a trade-off be made between modeling accuracy and computational burden.
III. ND-CGEM MODEL FORMULATION AND SOLUTION

A. Overall Design of the ND-CGEM Model
The ND-CGEM model is modeled as a stochastic programming problem. The problem aims to minimize the expected costs of the entire system and to derive prices for the resources. The inputs and outputs of the model is listed in Table I . ND-CGEM model serves as a DA market clearing tool to improve the efficiency and reasonability of DA schedules of the connected gas and power systems, and is compatible with the existing RT electricity market framework. Fig. 1 shows the overall design of the model. The single DA scenario represents the DA settlement, while the simulated RT scenarios are used to estimate the expected costs and are modeled in a similar manner as the DA one.
Compared to the SCUC model which is typically a mixedinteger linear programming (MILP) problem, the non-convex gas system constraints make the model more complex. First, even when the integer variables are fixed, the optimization problem is still non-convex and does not have dual variables, without which the prices cannot be defined. Second, solving a mixed- (2) DA unit schedules (p k t0 ); (3) Reserved gas supply capacity for the GFUs (x) and the associated price (η n g ,ca p ); (4) DA electricity and gas load schedules (Δl e m t0 and Δl N G ); (5) DA electricity and gas price (η e and η n g ); integer programming with non-convex components other than integrality is extremely time consuming, particularly when the non-convex constraints are duplicated for multiple scenarios. This is unacceptable for practical use. Therefore, two modifications are applied to the model. (1) The non-convex gas system constraints are removed from the problem using the general Benders decomposition (GBD) technique. The non-convex constraints, if binding, will be represented by some linearized cuts generated by the sub-problems (as described below). (2) Instead of applying the gas network constraints to each of the RT scenarios, the constraints are used only to limit the network capacity allocated in the DA market (see Assumption 2), and the RT gas consumption is simply constrained by the booked capacity.
B. Detailed Formulation 1) Objective Function:
The objective function describes the out-of-pocket costs of the entire system, which is formulated as
where, ϑ 1 t represents the cost incurred by the day-ahead decisions, including unit commitment costs, gas contract costs, gas load shedding costs; ϑ 2 t represents the weighted summation of subsequent cost in the day-ahead forecast scenario (ω = 0) and all the stochastic scenarios (ω ∈ Ω), including generation fuel cost, electricity load shedding costs and gas supply deviation fees. Because the goal is to minimize the expected costs, the costs associated with day-ahead forecast is assigned a smallenough weight (ρ 0 1, 0.001 in the case studies). And the weight factors assigned to the stochastic scenarios depend on the probability derived from the assumed distribution and satisfy ω ∈Ω ρ ω = 1. The objective is subject to the following constraints.
2) Power System Constraints:
where, constraint (2a) represents the logic relationship of the on/off, startup and shutdown state variables; constraints (2b) and (2c) describe the minimum on and off time of the units; constraints (3a) describe the system power balance. Constraints (0a) represent the maximum and minimum generation output of the units, respectively; Constraints (3c)-(3d) limit the units' upward and downward ramping rates, respectively; constraints (3e) describe the transmission capacity limits. The piece-wise fuel cost functions f (·) are also modeled using constraints but are not explicitly presented here for simplicity.
3) Gas System Constraints: The gas system is typically represented by its steady-state and dynamic characteristics [32] . Considering that the market is cleared in an hourly manner, only steady-state characteristics are considered. Linepack of the gas systems, which describes the gas stored in the pipes, are ignored in this paper. It is definitely more accurate to model linepack and related dynamics in the optimization problem because they have impacts on the gas system's ability to meet the demands [33] , [34] . However, as pointed by [35] , using linepack to meet the demand of GFUs during low wind periods can increase the risk of linepack depletion, and reduce the capability of the gas network to meet abrupt demand changes. Because the fluctuations of wind power are relatively more frequent, foreseeable and can be better represented by statistical models, better scheduling decisions can be made a priori to control the risk instead of solely relying on linepack.
Though simplified, the gas network models are still complex due to their non-convexity, which cannot be easily linearized as with the power transmission models.
The models of gas suppliers and loads are straightforward. The gas output is limited by the supplier's capacity. The gas loads have pre-declared consumption profiles. Some lowpriority loads can be curtailed at relatively low cost but the curtailing can only be planned in the DA market. The gas storage facilities are regarded as suppliers or loads because they do not frequently switch between the charging and discharging modes. The formulations are as follows:
where, constraint (4a) limits the gas output of the suppliers, constraint (4b) guarantees the non-negativity of the gas loads, and (5) means that when the gas load shedding decision is made, it is effective for all the scenarios. The gas transmission system usually consists of two major types of branches: pipelines and compressors. The commonly used models are adopted in this paper to describe these components [36] . The gas flow in a pipeline (y m n ) is determined by the gas pressure at the two ends (π m and π n ), diameter and length of the pipes, the temperature, etc. While the gas pressure is variable during operation, other factors are regarded as fixed and can be described by a constant parameter C m n :
It is assumed that the gas transmission directions can be changed during operation. This is possible when there are loops in the gas network. However, because static gas network models are used in this paper, only moderate changes can be properly described. Drastic changes in direction might involve complex dynamics and might require models that are more complicated.
Compressors are deployed in the networks to compensate for the pressure loss. The gas flow through a compressor is jointly determined by the pressure at the two ends and the horsepower of the compressor (h c ), as well as other fixed factors:
where, α c , k c1 and k c2 are empirical constants for a given compressor [36] .
The power output and compression ratio of a compressor is limited by its upper and lower bounds (constraints (7b) and (7c)), and it is assumed that a compressor consumes gas to generate power, which can be described by a quadratic function (constraint (7d)). In fact, the gas consumed by a compressor is quite negligible compared to the gas transmitted in the system. Therefore, a linear approximation of (7d) is acceptable.
As discussed in Section II, the gas transmission constraints are computationally expensive and cannot be included in all scenarios. Hence, constraints (6)- (7) are applied only to constrain the booked capacity of the GFUs. Then, the gas system nodal balance constraints can be modeled as
where, s j t represents the gas output of supplier j at time t when the gas consumption of the GFUs reaches at the full reserved capacity. Gas consumption by the GFUs in all DA and RT scenarios should be within the booked capacity, as presented by constraint (8b). Other constraints describing the gas market balance:
Constraint (8c) represents the gas supply and demand balance for DA gas market clearing. It should be noted that the gas contracts associated with the GFUs (w gt ) are not equal to the gas consumption of GFUs in the DA scenario (w gt0 ), because one of the model's targets is to minimize the gas contract deviation penalty. Constraint (8d) represent the system gas balance for the DA and RT scenarios, respectively, to which the network limits are no longer applied. Considering that the gas consumed by the compressors is minor, the quantity for each scenario is approximated and assumed to be the same for all scenarios. Constraints (8e)-(8f) defines the gas consumption deviations to gas contracts.
Again, it is important to note that, the linepack effect is not considered in the gas network models. When considering linepack, constraint (8c) will not hold strictly, and more equations are needed to describe linepack and its depletion. Without considering linepack effect, the gas network's capability in balancing the supply and demand is under-estimated. If proper modeling technique can be developed and computational efficiency can be guaranteed, it is suggested that linepack be included in the joint market model for better accuracy. However, as pointed out previously, some of the linepack should be left as reserves for abrupt gas load changes.
4) Power and Gas Coupling Constraints:
The power and gas systems are coupled by the GFUs. The coupling constraints are modeled as
The fuel consumption of the GFUs is typically modeled using a quadratic heat rate curve [18] and piecewise linearized in this paper for computation efficiency.
C. Solution
The above model is a mixed-integer non-convex programming problem, to which the common commercial MILP solvers are not directly applicable. Although there are some available non-convex programming solvers, they are usually designed for general purposes and therefore of poor computational performance. However, efficiency is the premise of a market clearing tool. Following the ideas of [13] , a GBD method is used in this paper to achieve a high-efficient solution of the above problem. Considering that the algorithm itself is not the main contribution of this paper, only the necessary procedures are included in this paper. Readers may refer to [13] for more details.
The strategy of the GBD method is divide and conquer. By isolating the gas network constraints from the rest constraints, the MILP property of the reduced model is guaranteed. The reduced model is called master problem. Meanwhile, the removed constraints are compiled as a series of feasibility check subproblems. To elaborate, the results given by the master problem will be tested in the sub-problems to see if they satisfy the gas transmission limits. If a feasibility check does not pass, a linear cut or a set of linear cuts representing related information will be generated and embedded into the master problem, guaranteeing that the market clearing results are at least a feasible solution.
The sub-problem is formulated as follows:
and, Constraints (6)- (7)where, variables marked by " * " are given by the master problem and treated as parameters in the sub-problem; among the parameters, ζ * gt represents the value of natural gas supply capacity to the power system, which is implied by the locational marginal electricity price (LMEP). ζ * gt can be derived after solving the master problem using (11):
where, the definition of η e Υ(g )tω is presented in Section III-D. Constraints (10b)-(10c) correspond to constraint (4a)-(4b), constraint (10d) means that the adjusted reserved gas supply capacity for GFUs should be positive. If the sub-problem returns a positive objective value, it means that some adjustments must be made to satisfy the gas transmission constraints.
Considering that the gas system constraints are not temporally coupled, the sub-problems are solved independently for each time period. Namely, feasibility check problems for the 24 hours are solved respectively (can be executed in parallel).
Because the feasibility check problems are non-convex, global optimality cannot be guaranteed. As suggested by [13] , a successive linear programming (SLP) approach is effective for solving the problem. Alternatively, a linearized model can be used after an optimum has been found by the interior-point optimizer. In this paper, the SLP approach is used. Readers may refer to [13] for the detailed algorithm.
If the feasibility check problem returns a positive optimal objective value, a linear cut is generated as follows: (12) where, μ N G is the dual variable of the correction constraints in the SLP model ([13, eq. (31)
]).
To summarize, the market clearing model is solved following the procedures in Fig. 2 . The master problem and feasibility check sub-problems are solved iteratively until the feasibility check sub-problems for all the 24 hours return a non-positive optimal objective value, which means the market clearing results satisfy the gas transmission constraints. 
D. Definition of the Prices and Cost Allocation Issues
Consistent with the traditional locational marginal pricing method, the prices are defined based on the dual variables of the master problem, with the integer variables fixed at their optimized values: (13) where, for DA market clearing, the price with ω = 0 is used.
It is assumed that the gas suppliers in a system share the same gas cost and do not bid strategically. This assumption is made to simplify the spot market model and is a fair assumption because the gas prices are typically uniform within a specific range of area. Alternatively, arbitrage will occur to rebuild the equilibrium. Moreover, the gas network constraints are imposed only on the allocation of booked gas demand capacity. Thus, the gas prices are solely determined by the dual variables of constraints (8c): (14) As for the reserved gas supply capacity, its pricing and cost allocation rules are remarkably different from the current practices. The reserved gas supply capacity is similar to the reserve products in the existing electricity market. They are cleared to guarantee that the scheduled power output and reserves of a GFU are truly deliverable, thus reducing the operational and economic risks of nearly all the market participants within the power system. Therefore, different from the traditional mechanism in which the cost of reserved gas capacity is implicitly embedded in the GFUs' bids, the cost of the reserved gas capacity is paid by the power system as a whole and then allocated to market participants in the proposed market rule. In this way, different resources are cleared and priced separately and utilized more efficiently.
The capacity prices are positive only when some low-priority loads are curtailed to fulfill the power system (potential) demand. Otherwise, they are zero. Though the gas prices are uniform, the capacity prices are locationally discrepant, which is determined by the dual variables of the added cuts: (15) It could be controversial to price the gas capacity with the dual variables of the linearized cuts. However, it is a good approximation for the value of gas capacity. More sophisticated convexification approaches for the gas transmission network model might be helpful to improve the approximation.
E. Revenue Adequacy of Reserved Gas Supply Capacity
Intrinsically, the ND-CGEM framework does not significantly change the way in which the existing energy and ancillary service products are settled. Therefore, the market equilibrium and revenue adequacy of those products are not a problem. However, a new product, i.e., reserved gas supply capacity, is introduced in the new market framework. To provide reserved gas supply capacity, some gas loads must be curtailed. Therefore, it is important to guarantee that the payment collected from reserved gas supply capacity can cover the compensation made to the curtailed loads. In other words, revenue adequacy of the new product must be justified. To prove the revenue is adequate within the proposed framework, firstly, we define the payment χ p and compensation χ c as Combine equation (17) and constraint (12), we have
When constraint (12) is binding, β ng i > 0. Therefore,
According to the KKT condition of the master problem when all the integer variables are fixed, we have Fig. 3 . 14-node gas transmission system. Combine equations (16), (19) and (20), we have
According to Lemma 1 proved in the Appendix, we have
Q.E.D. Therefore, the revenue of the new reserved gas supply capacity product is adequate.
IV. NUMERICAL CASES
A modified IEEE Reliability Test System [37] with 18 units (total capacity: 2,090 MW) and a 14-node gas transmission system with 3 gas suppliers (see Fig. 3 ) are used in this paper to demonstrate the performance of the proposed ND-CGEM framework. The model data of the two systems are provided in [38] and [39] . It is assumed that Gen3 and Gen13 are GFUs located at node 12 and 5 in the gas system, respectively. Without loss of generality, all gas loads are assumed to be 80% highpriority and 20% low priority.
A wind farm with a capacity of 400 MW is located at bus 8. The wind power is assumed to follow a beta distribution, with the parameters estimated based on the historical data provided by [40] and scaled down to fit the test system. For more details on how the probabilistic forecast is generated, readers may refer to [41] . To simulate the RT scenarios, 5,000 samples are generated following the estimated distribution and are reduced to 30 using the fast forward selection method [42] . Fig. 4 presents the wind power forecast and the associated scenarios of a specific day.
To reveal the effect of considering wind power uncertainty, the system schedules derived by the traditional deterministic SCUC and those derived by a stochastic SCUC are compared. Fig. 5 shows the results for a specific day, the GFUs are committed for more periods when uncertainty is considered, which implies that the power system relies on the GFUs' capacity to firm the variability of wind power. Therefore, with the deepening penetration of wind power, it is increasingly important to make sure that the flexibility provided by the GFUs are truly deliverable.
However, in the traditional market framework, reliable and economical supply of natural gas to the GFUs is not guaranteed. Considering that the wind power is uncertain, the quantity of gas consumed by the GFUs can be very different in the stochastic scenarios. Unless the GFUs are informed of all the market information, including the wind power forecasts and distributions, they are incapable of making efficient gas purchase contracts to minimize the deviation penalties. Taking Gen3 as an example, Fig. 6 demonstrates the total gas consumption and profiles of Gen3 during the day in different scenarios. As indicated by the results, the GFUs are exposed to significant risks of deviation penalties even if the gas contracts are signed daily; needless to say, the hourly profile is even more volatile. The results further indicate the importance of considering wind power uncertainty for making reasonable DA decisions.
When the power and gas systems compete for the same resources, the coordination might become important. As we have discussed in Section II, GFUs in the power systems share the gas transmission capacity with gas loads. As shown jointly by Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 , the period from Hour 17 to Hour 22 during which the GFU is heavily used, is also a gas load peak on that day. If the two systems are not coordinated, the gas loads will not be re-scheduled to reserve gas supply for GFUs to generate power and the GFU will suffer from insufficient gas supply (see Fig. 8 ), which implies that if the model of gas transmission system is not considered, there will be a risk that the scheduled flexibilities from the GFUs are actually not available in RT operation. If that is the case, the power system might have to commit more expensive resources or even curtail loads, leading to much higher costs. However, there could be potential overall social welfare improvement if such a shortage in gas supply for power generation is predicted by electric-gas market coordination and the gas load is properly compensated for being curtailed. The premise of coordinating the allocation of gas transmission capacity resources is that the model of the pipelines, compressors and gas suppliers are explicitly modeled in the market clearing model.
It is assumed that the gas prices are $2/kcf at the gas suppliers and that the costs of curtailing the low-priority and high-priority loads are $3/kcf and $1,000/kcf respectively. The option of shifting the loads across the periods is not considered but can be easily modeled within the framework. The ND-CGEM model is tested based on the above assumptions. Fig. 9 shows the capacity that is scheduled to the GFUs in the joint market compared to the maximum gas demand among the scenarios when the gas system is not considered. The increase in supply capacity for Gen3 from Hour 22 to Hour 23 is due to a re-balance of power output between Gen3 and Gen13. Although not all demands are satisfied, the ND-CGEM model does choose to curtail some of the low-priority loads (see Table II ) to reduce the overall system costs. The prices of gas supply capacity for the two GFUs are also presented in Fig. 10 . The results indicate that the gas capacity price is zero when there is no congestion in the gas networks. Fig. 9 . Gas supply capacity for the GFUs in the joint market compared to the maximum gas demand when the gas system is not considered. In the above case, the compensation made to the curtailed gas loads equals $1498.32, while the total payment of reserved gas supply capacity equals $6190.39, meaning that the revenue is adequate. The revenue surplus can be put into a fund for future gas transmission facility expansion. Or, some financial products similar to the financial transmission right deployed in electricity market can be defined to allocate the surplus. Besides the reserved gas supply capacity, other products are cleared and settled in the same way as they are in the existing market framework. To save space, the clearing and settlement results for energy and other traditional products are not listed here.
The joint cleared market can also help determine the optimal volume of DA gas supply contracts. As shown in Fig. 10 , the deviations are distributed around zero, which helps the GFUs, i.e., the entire power system, reduce deviation penalties.
The optimized expected overall cost of the gas and electricity system is $1,612,614, which is 0.19% higher than the overall cost when the two systems are not coordinated ($1,609,555). Although at a lower cost, the non-coordinated schedules are actually infeasible. To compare, an additional 1,000 wind power scenarios are generated to simulate the RT operation of the system under coordinated and non-coordinated DA schedules. Fig. 11 shows the average system-wide RT LMEP among the simulated scenarios. The results indicate that the re-dispatch costs can be higher than expected without coordinating the DA schedules of the two systems. However, if linepack effect is considered and the gas load fluctuations are not simulated, the RT LMEP spread might be less severe than demonstrated.
The modeling error, which represents the deviation between expected cost and simulated cost, is minor. Which means that though limited scenarios are included in the ND-CGEM model, the objective function can still provide a good estimation of future cost. As shown in Table III , the modeling error is all negative in the test cases. This is because that the ND-CGEM model cannot cover all the extreme scenarios, in which the cost can be much higher than usual. It is not always better to include more stochastic scenarios in the ND-CGEM model: as long as adequate level of modeling accuracy is achieved, additional scenarios are unnecessary and will only bring extra computational burden. It should be addressed that the existence of modeling error is inevitable but controllable, and does not affect the conclusion that ND-CGEM can help reduce overall system cost.
The simulation results for more days are presented in Table III . As expected, the non-coordinated approach always tends to underestimate the actual costs, whereas the ND-CGEM framework provides a better estimation. Moreover, the actual cost with the ND-CGEM approach can be 2% lower than the non-coordinated approach by making better DA schedules. This is because that the resources which the two systems are competing for are explicitly modeled in the market clearing tool and reasonably allocated via a market approach. Cases 2, 5, 7 and 10 represent the situations when the gas pipelines are not congested. As shown by the results, the ND-CGEM model and the non-coordinated approach, as expected, provide the same results.
A sensitivity analysis on the cost of curtailing gas loads is also conducted (see Table IV ). In a randomly picked case, with the cost of curtailing gas load increasing, the amount of total gas load curtailment decreases. The total compensation paid to curtailed gas loads does not follow a monotonic relationship with λ N G d , but it finally decreases to 0 when curtailing gas loads is no longer economical. The cost of curtailing gas loads is an indicator of the value of gas supply to the gas consumers.
The results indicate that, the CGEM model can automatically allocate the gas transmission capacity to the party who needs it the most, which cannot be achieved in the traditional noncoordinated framework. All of the cases are run on a laptop with a Xeon E3-1535M CPU and 16 GB of RAM. The optimization problems are solved using the commercial solver Gurobi 6.5. The optimization problem includes 172,416 variables (1,276 variables are binary variables) and 416,700 constraints. When the relative gap for the MILP problems is set at 10 −4 , the average solving time for the above cases is approximately 231 s, with 1-5 outer-loop iterations. The peak memory consumption is always under 50 Mb. When the number of RT scenarios increases to 80, the time increases to approximately 411 s, and peak memory consumption increases to about 100 Mb. Table V shows the iteration process of a specific case, in which the overall time consumption is 258.9 s, and peak memory consumption 23.1 Mb. The number of sub-problem iterations indicates the overall number of SLP problems calculated for the 24-hour gas transmission feasibility problems. There is considerable potential for improved computation and memory consumption performance considering that the programs are not specially optimized. For further improvements, the feasibility check sub-problems can be easily solved in a parallel manner for better efficiency. More advanced decomposition methods might be helpful to handle the stochastic scenarios. To apply the proposed framework to larger or practical systems, modifications on the algorithm is of importance.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This paper proposes and examines a framework of joint gas and electricity markets considering wind power uncertainty. With the ND-CGEM model, the GFUs are no longer responsible for making forecasts regarding future gas consumption to bid in the gas market considering natural gas-fired generation in the power system operation or bearing the risks of improper gas contracts and insufficient gas supply. Moreover, the gas transmission resources are better allocated. When the gas network capacity is urgently demanded by the power system, the joint market can help curtail some of the low-priority gas loads by compensating for the lost utility. The case studies indicate that better DA market clearing results can be achieved. The solution algorithm shows acceptable computational performance, although further improvements might be needed when applying the framework to larger systems. The proposed stochastic marketing clearing framework can also be applied in a deterministic setting using only one scenario in the real-time market simulation.
It should be addressed that, though some compromises have been made to reach at a balance between modeling accuracy and complexity, the proposed model is still not ready for practical use in its current state. On one hand, some of the assumptions are very generalized. When facing specific markets and systems, the model can be further modified to reduce complexity. On the other hand, more advanced techniques for modeling the non-linear components and solving the stochastic optimization problem are still needed.
For future works, a convexification of the gas transmission network model might be helpful to overcome the local op-timum of nonlinear sub-problems. Moreover, decomposition algorithms can also be applied to the stochastic optimization problem to increase the computational efficiency. In addition, using a linearized model [16] instead of applying successive linearization might also be a potential choice for developing the market clearing model, with which the iterations in a GBD process could be avoided. Furthermore, better techniques for modeling the linepack effect in RT operation should be developed to help represent the gas network's capacity more accurately. 
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